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Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of public policies supporting open
source software (OSS). Users can be divided between those who know
about the existence of OSS, the ”informed” adopters, and the ”unin-
formed” ones; the presence of uniformed users yields to market fail-
ures that justify government intervention. We study three policies: i)
mandatory adoption, when government forces public agencies, schools
and universities to adopt OSS, ii) information campaign, when the gov-
ernment informs the uninformed users about the existence and the char-
acteristics of OSS and, iii) subsidisation, when consumers are payed a
subsidy when adopting OSS. We show that the second policy enhances
welfare, the third is always welfare decreasing while mandatory adop-
tion can be either good or bad for society depending on the number of
informed and uninformed adopters. We extend the model to the pres-
ence of network eﬀects and we show that strong externalities require
”drastic” policies.
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Open source software is currently one of the most debated phenomena in the
software industry, both theoretically and empirically. At the most basic level,
the term open source software simply means software for which the source code
is open and available. The source code is the program in which a software is
originally written. A software is said ”open” when its source code can be read
(seen) and written (modiﬁed) by everybody. Availability implies that anybody
can acquire the code either free of charge or for a nominal fee (usually media
and shipping charges or online connection charges).1
In recent years, the growth and development of the open source movement
has been boosted by the Internet: today, making a source code available can
be as simple as posting it on the World Wide Web or in an online newsgroup.
Furthermore, making the software open is also extremely simple, i.e. place no
restrictions on how the software is actually used or by whom.
Typically, open source software has been extremely successful in those seg-
ments of the market where the potential purchasers are ”sophisticated users”,
i.e. system and server administrators or more generally those that are expe-
rienced in handling computers and that, for this reason, are well aware of all
various packages available. Just to take a relevant example, the open source
software Apache is currently the most popular software for web servers; its
market share is about 60% of the total, more than two times larger than
Microsoft, its ”closed source” commercial rival.2 Other examples of well es-
tablished open source softwares are Sendmail, the dominant messaging service
program for routing and handling email by email servers and Linux, an oper-
ating system which is probably the best-known example of the emerging open
source software movement, which has a current market share of about 30%.3
Open source software has recently attracted a great amount of attention.
Many researchers have focused on explaining where contributors ﬁnd their mo-
tivations to develop new software or to improve the existing one, provided that
open source software and its further developments are usually made available
at zero price. Any software improvement is a costly activity, and supplying it
for free does not reﬂect these costs; other beneﬁts related to career concerns
and/or ego gratiﬁcation must be taken into account when analysing moti-
vations for open source software developers. Lerner and Tirole (2002) and
1All the details related to the open source software movement can be found at the web
site www.opensource.org/.
2Since 2000 Netcraft.com is counting the active web servers. See www.netcraft.com.
3There are many others very well known open source software packages such as the
programming language PERL, the standard for secure communications over the Internet
OpenSSL, the world famous browser Mozilla or the database MySQL.
2Lakhani and von Hippel (2000) go in this direction. A diﬀerent explanation
has been oﬀered by Raymond (1999) which stresses on the idea that open
source is a form of gift economy based on altruistic motives.4
The open source software is attracting a lot of attention not just in the
computing and in the academic communities but, recently, also in the political
arena. Many governments around the world are actually supporting open
source software or are in the process of supporting it, thus tilting the playing
ﬁeld towards open source.5
Various rationales have been put forward to justify active government poli-
cies. Supporters of such interventions argue that open source is technically
superior with respect to the closed one, that it is more stable and secure since
it allows adopters to check and ﬁx on their own any possible bug and to opti-
mise systems against viruses. Moreover, the possibility of accessing the source
code, allows adopters to tailor the software to their speciﬁc needs. Also, from
a more dynamic perspective, some argue that open source software provides a
better ”environment” to spur innovation. The availability of the source code
makes it easier for software developers to improve upon the already existing
programs.
Even though it is not our aim to discuss and evaluate the alleged superiority
of open source, we observe that this cannot be considered as a justiﬁcation for
active policy interventions. After all, absent market failures, the market is the
natural place where diﬀerent products compete. If it is technically superior,
then more consumers will decide to adopt the open source software rather
than the closed source alternative and the market will standardise on the open
source without any external intervention. From an economic point of view,
governments should intervene only when market forces do not yield a socially
eﬃcient allocation.
We believe that an important aspect that has to be taken into account to
understand the software market and its possible failures relates to the presence
of diﬀerent typologies of users. As pointed out above, the open source soft-
ware has been particularly successful in those segments of the market where
the potential demand is made of sophisticated users. On the contrary, in the
mass-diﬀusion segments, where the demand typically comes from less sophis-
ticated consumers who are generally not informed about the existence and/or
the characteristics of the various packages, open source softwares have hardly
4The organisational literature surrounding open source is now quite well developed. A
part from the mentioned papers based on the altruistic/ego gratiﬁcation motives, others
strands of literature focus on diﬀerent motivations for open source software developers. A
complete survey of this literature can be found in Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2003).
5A clear, non technical and comprehensive discussion of government policies towards
open source software is in Hahn (2002).
3gained relevant market shares. Many open source packages that have been
developed to target the mass-diﬀusion segments have failed in this scope. The
typical example is OpenOﬃce, a suite which has been created in direct compe-
tition with Microsoft Oﬃce in the market for oﬃce applications. According to a
recent review by the Washington Post, OpenOﬃce has not gained a signiﬁcant
share of the market in spite of the fact that its performances are comparable
with those of the rival software6 and that it is supplied for free.
The presence of a large fraction of unsophisticated or ”uninformed” users,
especially in the mass-diﬀusion segments, is somehow intrinsic in the software
industry. While closed source software is produced and sold by commercial
ﬁrms who have strong incentives to advertise their products and to inform
potential adopters about their packages’ features, the open source software
is usually distributed by individual developers or by news groups, who have
diﬀerent motivations rather than proﬁt maximisation.
Starting from this simple observation, the aim of this paper is to study the
eﬀects on social welfare of the various forms of interventions that have been
envisaged by many governments around the world. The analysis moves from
a recent contribution by Schmidt and Schnitzer (2002); the set up is based on
a very simple static model in which two software products are oﬀered. The
closed source software is supplied by a commercial ﬁrm, while the open source
is sold at marginal cost by a fringe of independent developers.
Absent quality diﬀerences between products, we assume that potential
adopters can be segmented into two distinct categories: the informed users
who know about the existence of both the closed and the open source software
and the uninformed ones who ignore the existence and/or characteristics of
the open source alternative. Clearly, competition between open and closed
source software occurs only in the market for informed users and we model it
according to a standard Hotelling-like framework.
In the ﬁrst part of the paper we look at the pure market equilibrium, that
is the equilibrium when the government does not intervene; from this analysis
we are able to characterise the presence of market failures. The remaining
sections of the paper are devoted to present the impact on social welfare of
the most commonly proposed government policies intended to correct these
market failures. We show that while welfare increases when the government
supports open source software through an information campaign aimed at
6Rob Pegoraro in an article appeared in the Washington Post (”The oﬃce suite and
lets you see past Redmond, Washington Post, May 12, 2002, p.H07”) states that ”After
using the Windows version of OpenOﬃce for the past week and a half, I can attest that it
either matches or beats Microsoft Oﬃce in features and ease of use, at the cost of slower
performance on older computers and the occasional slight garbling of complicated Microsoft
Oﬃce documents.”
4informing the uninformed users about the existence of the open source software,
a more intrusive and direct policy in support of the open source based on direct
subsidisation of those who adopt this software always harms society. Finally,
when the policy consists of mandating public agencies, bureaus, public schools
or universities to adopt open source software then welfare may increase or not
according on how the market is segmented between informed and uninformed
users.
In the last section of the paper we extend the model by introducing network
externalities, a commonly recognised feature of software markets. Our main
message is that when network eﬀects are pervasive enough, the policies work
only if they are suﬃciently ”drastic” and induce the market to standardise on
one of the two products. Perfect standardisation allows network eﬀects to be
at their maximum level, thus increasing welfare.
Our analysis is essentially static: it does not contemplate neither R&D
activity from software producers nor ﬁrms’ entry and compatibility strategies,
which have both dynamic nature.7 In particular, one of the reasons that has
been put forward to justify government intervention in favor of the open source
movement is that open source developers have more incentives to innovate
than those working for a commercial producer. This is a very interesting
and controversial issue: both Smith (2002) and Schmidt and Schnitzer (2002)
contrast this argument and argue that it is the marketplace rather than the
policy arena to provide the right incentives to ensure continuous innovation.
Bessen (2002) argues in favor of open source; he contends that open source
addresses market failures associated with incomplete contracts and asymmetric
information: the government should remove the impediments it has imposed
to developers through software patents, which tilt the market in favor of pro-
prietary developers.
As it is clear from this concise discussion, the issue of government inter-
vention in the software market is still very much debated. The vast majority
of the literature does not provide a suﬃciently developed analytical frame-
work able to analyse the complex intricacies of the various issues at stake; our
contribution is a ﬁrst, although simple, eﬀort to try to ﬁll this gap.
1.1 Government policies towards open source
To understand current governments thinking on open source it is useful to
survey the major public initiatives to support open source software (OSS here-
after).8
7Note that in this static framework, the main and only characteristic of open source
software is that it is oﬀered free of charge.
8We follow Hahn (2002).
5Governments are great purchasers of computer software. As reported in
Evans and Reddy (2002), the US government alone spent $3.7 billion on soft-
ware in 2000. A ﬁrst and direct public intervention in the software market is
therefore very simple: whatever its merits and characteristics, mandate adop-
tion of OSS in public administration and at schools or universities.
Many governments have already decided to support OSS in this way: in
Latin America, the Brazilian government passed a legislation that mandates
OSS to be adopted in municipal governments; in Germany, the Bundestag
mandated all public administrations servers to run Linux. In other countries,
pending legislations are waiting for parliamentary approval: in Europe, the
French parliament is actually discussing a bill that forbids to use anything but
OSS. In Italy too a similar legislation is currently under discussion.
Other governments, such as Germany and Singapore, have also adopted
a diﬀerent approach. Singapore is oﬀering tax breaks to companies that use
the open source Linux operating system instead of Windows; in Germany,
an agreement has been reached between the government and IBM that oﬀers
discounts on IBM machines with preinstalled Linux. In both these examples,
the adoption of OSS rather than the commercial alternative is subsidised either
through a tax saving or a hardware discount.
A third policy, certainly less intrusive than the ﬁrst two and for this rea-
son also very popular around the world, is based on supporting OSS through
promotional campaigns. In the US, many public education consortiums are
promoting OSS. Just to take an example, in North Mississippi, in August 2002
the local Education Consortium has adopted a pilot program called ”freedom
to learn” aimed at campaigning OSS in public schools: students will be intro-
duced to OSS through 2002 and 2003 school years. It must be noted that all
the initiatives based on mandating public schools to adopt OSS also fall in this
third category: by using OSS at schools, students learn about OSS and this
certainly constitutes a form of promotional campaign. In Spain, the parlia-
ment is discussing a bill which requires regional governments to take initiatives
to promote open source products.
Following these examples, it is possible to distinguish the various public
initiatives towards OSS in the following three broad categories: i) mandatory
adoption, ii) subsidisation and iii) information campaign.
62 The model
2.1 Firm’s behavior
Competition occurs between a closed source software (CSS hereafter) and an
open source software. CSS is supplied by a single commercial ﬁrm while OSS
is oﬀered by a fringe of independent developers.
The two products are horizontally diﬀerentiated and we model competition
using a standard Hotelling framework; the two products are located at the
extremes of a unit length segment: CSS at 0 and OSS at 1.
Open source software is sold at marginal cost while CSS is priced at p by its
producer. We assume zero marginal production cost for the two products and
that the commercial vendor is not able to discriminate consumers according
to their location or to their typology and it therefore charges only one price.
2.2 Consumers
There are two typologies of consumers: a) the ”informed” users, i.e. those who
know about the existence of both CSS and OSS and that take their adoption de-
cision comparing the utility given by each alternative, and b) the ”uniformed”
users, i.e. those who ignore the existence of OSS and therefore when taking
their adoption decision consider only the closed source software.
We assume for simplicity that the population of consumers is of mass 1:
a portion η are the uninformed and the remaining 1 − η are the informed
ones. Irrespectively on their type, consumers are uniformly distributed on a
unit length segment. A consumer located at x ∈ [0,1] gets a net utility from
buying the closed source software of
Uc = v − tx − p, (1)
where v is the gross utility from adopting the software, t is a transportation
cost and p is the price charged by the CSS producer. t may be interpreted in
many ways: the cost of learning how to use the software, the installation cost
or the cost of adapting other software applications.
Similarly, the consumer’s net utility from adopting OSS is
Uo = v − t(1 − x). (2)
73 Pure market equilibrium, market failures and
government policies
In order to highlight the presence and the characteristics of market failures,
and therefore the scope for a possible government intervention, we need to
determine the pure market equilibrium, that is, the outcome that arises when
no public policy is in place; we then compare this equilibrium with the social
optimum. Let us start with the pure market equilibrium.9
3.1 Pure market equilibrium
The two software packages compete only in the market of the informed users.
In this case, given the price p charged by the producer of the closed source,
the indiﬀerent consumer is the one who gets the same net utility from the two
versions of the software. Formally, the indiﬀerent consumer is located at xi,
where xi solves the following:10




Uninformed users ignore that an open source software is available and con-
front the utility that they receive when adopting CSS with the zero utility of
not buying any software. Therefore the indiﬀerent uniformed consumer is the
one located at xu, where xu is the solution of:11




Given xi, xu and the distribution of consumers among informed and unin-
formed types, the proﬁts for the CSS producer are
π = p((1 − η)xi + ηxu). (5)




t(1 − η) + 2ηv
2(1 + η)
. (6)
9The presence of market failures drives our model away from Evans (2002), where it is
claimed that the market is ”per-se” eﬃcient.
10The subscript i stays for ”informed”.
11The subscript u stays for ”uninformed”.






which is clearly always satisﬁed.
8Given its inability to price discriminate, the ﬁrm charges a price p¤ which
is a weighted average between the optimal prices that it would charge if it were
able to discriminate consumers according to their typology; formally, it is easy

















2 are the optimal prices that the ﬁrm would charge to
the informed and uninformed consumer respectively and where the weights of
these two prices depend on the distribution of consumers in the two segments
of the market. Clearly, the larger (resp. smaller) the mass of uninformed
consumers (´ high/resp. low), the closer p¤ is to p¤
u (resp. p¤
i). In other words,
when setting p¤ the closed source software producer cares more of one segment
of the market or the other depending on its relative magnitude.
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Figure 1 gives a graphical representation of the pure market equilibrium.



















Figure 1: pure market equilibrium
13Note that we need to impose restrictions on the parameters in order to ensure the
existence of the model. See the Appendix.
9It is worth noting that in the segment of the informed consumers, OSS
market share is larger than that of CSS. This is an obvious consequence of the
fact that the former is given away for free, while the latter is priced at p∗ > 0.
In the segment of uninformed users, CSS is adopted by all those consumers
who are located to the left of x∗
u. Consumers located further away from the
CSS do not adopt any software at all.
Finally, having deﬁned the equilibrium market allocations and the price,
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. (11)
Total welfare is deﬁned as the sum of consumers surplus and ﬁrm’s proﬁt:
W = Su + Si + π.
3.2 First and second best allocations
Let us now consider the socially optimal solution, namely the allocation that
a welfare maximising planner would obtain by assigning consumers with one
of the two software packages.
All through the paper we assume that v > t
2; this condition ensures that
it is eﬃcient to assign each informed consumer with one of the two softwares
(either OSS or CSS). It is worth distinguishing between two cases: second best
and ﬁrst best.
3.2.1 Second best
We deﬁne second best as the welfare maximising allocation under the con-
straint that uninformed consumers can only adopt CSS; this is equivalent to
say that the regulator decides ”who is going to adopt and what” but she takes
as given the distribution of consumers between informed and uninformed.
In this case, given that the two softwares have the same gross valuation,
v, the social optimum requires the minimization of the transportation costs in
the segment of informed consumers; conversely, in the segment of uninformed
consumers, the social surplus is maximised when all the individuals for which
the gross valuation v is larger than the transportation cost adopt the closed
source software.
10Remark 1 (Second best allocation). The second best is achieved when i) the
informed consumers adopt CSS for x ≤ 1/2 and OSS otherwise and ii) the
uniformed consumers adopt the CSS for x ≤ min{v/t,1}.
3.2.2 First best
By ﬁrst best we mean the situation in which the planner can also determine the
typology of the consumers. This amounts to say that the government is also
able to decide the distribution of consumers between informed and uninformed.
Remark 2 (First best allocation). The ﬁrst best is achieved when i) all con-
sumers are informed (η = 0) and ii) those located at x ≤ 1/2 adopt CSS and
OSS otherwise.
By choosing η = 0, the planner is able to replicate any possible allocation
that it can be obtained when η > 0. Therefore, when there are no uninformed
consumers, the social welfare is at least as large as when η > 0. Moreover,
it is socially optimal to allocate all the (informed) consumers in a way that
minimises the transportation costs. As for the second best, this occurs when
consumers are equally split between the two products: those to the left of 1/2
adopt CSS, while the remaining adopt OSS. Clearly, the second best allocation
converges to the ﬁrst best as η goes to zero: welfare tends to increase the
smaller the mass of uninformed consumers.
3.2.3 Market failures
Market failures can be easily determined by simple comparison of the social
optimum with the pure market equilibrium given in expressions (8) and (9);
our set-up encompasses three diﬀerent failures, which are summarised in the
following remarks.
Remark 3 (Market failure 1). Too few informed consumers adopt CSS: x∗
i < 1/2.
As already discussed, in the segment of informed consumers, social opti-
mality would require to split consumers equally between the two products in
order to minimise transportation costs. However, market forces do not yield
this outcome: since CSS is supplied at p∗, while OSS is available for free, the
latter is adopted by ”too many” informed consumers.
11Remark 4 (Market failure 2). Conditional on the presence of uninformed con-
sumers, η > 0, too few adopt CSS, x∗
u < min{v/t,1}.
Remark 5 (Market failure 3). Uninformed consumers do not make social op-
timal adoption decisions.
Failures 2 and 3 are related to the monopolistic segment of the industry,
that is that of uninformed consumers. As in a standard monopoly setting, a too
little amount of CSS is sold: there is a deadweight loss due to the presence of
a monopolistic producer (market failure 2). Furthermore also those consumers
who would have optimally adopted OSS either do not buy any software at all
or do adopt the wrong one. This means that due to their ignorance about
the existence of OSS, some uninformed consumers do not make the socially
optimal adoption decision (market failure 3).
3.3 Government policies towards OSS
As we have neatly discussed in the introduction, government policies towards
OSS may take essentially three forms. On the one side, governments may force
agencies, schools or universities to adopt OSS. Alternatively, a less intrusive
policy may be based on informing people about the existence and charac-
teristics of OSS. Finally, the government can subsidise the adoption of the
software open source through monetary incentives. We deﬁne the ﬁrst policy
as mandatory adoption, the second as information campaign and the third as
subsidisation.
Clearly, the government may actually decide to undertake a sort of ”policy
mix” by combining two or more of these policies. Furthermore, also without an
explicit policy mix, both subsidisation and mandatory adoption have intrinsi-
cally an informative nature. Never the less, the aim of the paper is to study
each policy in isolation from the others, in order to disentangle their ”true”
welfare eﬀect. The evaluation of a policy mix is therefore a simple combination
of the results that we obtain for each policy and it can be easily derived.
The ﬁrst two policies have the eﬀect of changing the masses of consumers
belonging to the two typologies of informed and uninformed, while the third
one has the eﬀect of increasing consumers valuation for OSS. Formally, we
model these policies in the following way:
1. mandatory adoption: the government randomly selects an amount β of
consumers and forces them to adopt OSS. As a consequence, the mass
of informed consumers reduces to (1 − β)(1 − η), while the mass of
uninformed consumers reduces to (1 − β)η.
122. information campaign: the government informs a share α of the unin-
formed consumers about the existence and characteristics of the OSS. As
a consequence, the mass of uninformed consumers becomes η − α, while
that of the informed ones increases to 1 − η + α.
3. subsidisation: the government pays a subsidy s to every individual who
adopts OSS. Therefore, the gross consumer’s valuation of OSS becomes
v + s.
4 Mandatory adoption
The ﬁrst policy that we analyse is mandatory adoption. With this policy the
government forces some or all the public agencies, universities and schools
to adopt OSS. More precisely, we consider the case in which the government
imposes to these consumers either to adopt OSS or not to adopt any software
at all.14
It is realistic to assume that, as for the closed source producer, also the
regulator ignores the location (i.e. the preferences) of each consumer and also
that she cannot distinguish between informed and uninformed users. As a
consequence, with this policy the government randomly extracts an amount
β ∈ (0,1) of consumers from the entire population and forces them to adopt
OSS. The mass of informed consumers reduces to (1−η)(1−β), that of unin-
formed consumers reduces η (1−β), while β represents the mass of mandated
consumers.
Clearly, this policy has the eﬀect of reducing the mass of potential CSS
adopters. However, the proportion of informed to uninformed consumers re-
mains unchanged. This fact implies that the weights in expression (7) do not
change and that the policy does not alter the equilibrium price p∗ nor the
equilibrium indiﬀerent consumers deﬁned in expressions (8) and (9).
The impact of the mandatory adoption on total welfare is summarised in
the following Proposition.
Proposition 1. Only if the mass of uniformed consumers is suﬃciently large,
it is optimal to mandate the adoption of the open source software. Formally
there exists a unique ¯ η ∈ (0,1) such that:
dW
dβ
> 0 if and only if η > ¯ η.
14Mandated consumers adopt OSS only if v − t(1 − x) ≥ 0, while they do not adopt any
software if v − t(1 − x) < 0.
13The eﬀect of the policy on the surplus of the various agents can be eas-
ily understood. Since the mass of CSS potential adopters reduces, proﬁts for
the commercial ﬁrm decline. Conversely, the eﬀect on consumers’ surpluses
depends on the typology of users. Given that p∗ does not change, the surplus
of those consumers who are not mandated to adopt OSS is not altered. The
informed consumers who are now mandated to adopt OSS are, overall, worse-
oﬀ: those who shift from CSS to OSS as a consequence of the policy obtain a
strictly smaller level of utility, while those who were already adopting the OSS
are not aﬀected by the policy. On the contrary, the impact on the uninformed
consumers who are now mandated by the government depends on their loca-
tion: while the policy harms those uninformed that have strong preferences
towards CSS (formally, those located closed to the origin in ﬁgure 1b), the
uniformed that without the policy were not buying any software are clearly
better-oﬀ. On average, the latter positive eﬀect dominates the former.
From this discussion, it is clear that only the uniformed users who are man-
dated by the government to adopt OSS may beneﬁt from the policy. There-
fore, according to Proposition 1, mandatory adoption is welfare increasing only
when the mass of uninformed users is suﬃciently large.15
In terms of market failures, since x∗
i and x∗
u remain unchanged, the policy
does not aﬀect market failures 1 and 2: the allocation of informed consumers
does not minimise the transportation costs and there is still the deadweight
loss in the segment of uninformed users. On the contrary, mandatory adoption
has a positive eﬀect on type 3 market failure since some uninformed consumers
that previously were not adopting any software, now buy OSS, while others
eﬃciently move from CSS to OSS.
5 Information campaign
Through an information campaign, some uninformed consumers receive in-
formation about the existence and the characteristics of OSS. Formally, this
policy consists in moving a fraction α ∈ [0,η] of consumers from the unin-
formed to the informed segment of the market. As a consequence, the mass of
consumers that remain uninformed reduces to η − α, while that of informed
becomes 1−η+α. In our analysis we assume that the government implements
such a policy at no cost.
15This result contrasts with Schmidt and Schnitzer (2003) where mandatory adoption
always hurts society; this is due to the strong assumption that while the ﬁrm is not able
to discriminate between informed and uninformed consumers, the government actually dis-
criminates consumers and selects only the informed ones when mandating the adoption of
the open source software.
14The study of this case closely resembles the one conducted when present-
ing the pure market equilibrium. However, as the proportion of informed to
uninformed consumers changes, the optimal price charged by the commercial
producer is also altered. As it is shown in the appendix:16
dp∗
dα
> 0 if and only if t > v.
Consider the expression of the pure market optimal price (7). Since the
information campaign increases the proportion of informed users, then the
optimal price converges towards p∗
i. It is easy to verify that when t > v, then
p∗
i > p∗
u and therefore in this case the optimal price increases with α.
The next Proposition characterises the eﬀect on total welfare of the infor-
mation campaign:
Proposition 2. Supporting the open source software through a costless infor-
mation campaign always increases welfare:
dW
dα
> 0 ∀ α ∈ [0,η].
As in the case of mandatory adoption, the eﬀect of the policy on producer
surplus is straightforward: since the policy shrinks the captive market of un-
informed users, it undoubtedly harms the ﬁrm.
To understand the eﬀect of the information campaign on consumer’s surplus
we need to distinguish between two cases depending on whether the price
charged for the closed source software decreases (this happens when t ≤ v) or
increases (t > v) with α. Suppose that p∗ decreases with α; in this case all the
consumers are better-oﬀ. More precisely, while the informed consumers who
adopt CSS beneﬁt from a lower price, the policy does not have any impact
on those who adopt OSS. Uninformed consumers who adopt CSS beneﬁt from
a reduction in p∗ while those who do not adopt any software are unaﬀected.
Finally, all the uninformed consumers who become informed as a consequence
of the campaign, are better-oﬀ. If they adopt CSS they are charged a lower
price, while if they adopt OSS they beneﬁt from a choice that was not available
before.
From this discussion it is clear that when the policy induces the ﬁrm to
charge a lower price, the information campaign makes the market working bet-
ter in all respects; each market failure is lessened by the policy: it increases
16In the proof of Proposition 2, we show that the ﬁrm’s optimal price in this case is:
p∗ =
t(1 − η + α) + 2v (η − α)
2(1 + η − α)
. (12)
It easy to verify that
dp
∗
dα > 0 if t > v.
15the share of consumers having adopted CSS both in the segment of informed
and in the segment of uniformed consumers (failures 1 and 2) and, obviously,
it induces some previously uninformed users to take a more appropriate deci-
sion (failure 3). Therefore, it should not be a surprise that the total welfare
increases with α.
However, as stated by Proposition 2, the information campaign always
increases welfare, also when it induces an increase in the price of the closed
source software. In this case, market failures 1 and 2 become more severe
but these negative eﬀects are still dominated by the positive eﬀect on market
failure 3. In other words, the fact that an additional fraction α of consumers
is now able to make a more informed adoption decision makes the proposed
policy always welfare enhancing.
6 Subsidisation
We end this ﬁrst part of the paper with the analysis of the last policy: gov-
ernment subsidisation of OSS.
We model this policy by assuming that the government pays a monetary
transfer s to each individual who adopt the open source software; formally,
this amounts to assuming that the gross utility from adopting OSS becomes
v + s. Moreover, we also assume that the cost of the subsidy is entirely borne
by the society through lump sum taxation.17 The following proposition can be
easily proved:




The policy clearly induces the CSS producer to charge a diﬀerent price for
its product. Nevertheless, to get more intuition of Proposition 3, consider ﬁrst
what happens if p∗ does not change. The utility of all those consumers who
adopt OSS increases of an amount s. However, this positive eﬀect is exactly
oﬀset by the increase in government expenditures and, therefore, for these
consumers there is no net welfare eﬀect. Similarly, also for those consumers
who adopt CSS there is no eﬀect on social welfare: their utility does not
change nor the government pays any subsidy to them. On the contrary, for
those consumers who move from CSS to OSS as a consequence of the policy,
the net eﬀect on welfare is strictly negative. The increase in the utility of
these consumers does not compensate the increase in government expenditure.
17For simplicity, we assume that taxation does not have additional distortionary eﬀects.
16Without subsidies, CSS is their preferred software, and when moving to OSS
they get higher utility but the increase is certainly smaller than s.
Finally, the policy obviously hurts the producer of the closed source soft-
ware; it is possible to show that the ﬁrm has to cut its price in order to protect
its market. While consumers beneﬁt from this price decrease, the overall wel-
fare eﬀect of a subsidy is negative.
In terms of market failures, while subsidising OSS does not impact type 3
market failure, it mitigates failure 2 and it worsens failure 1. Given that the
subsidy induces the commercial software producer to lower its price then the
deadweight loss in the uninformed segment is reduced. However, it is possible
to verify that the reduction in p∗ does not entirely compensate the subsidy
payed to OSS adopters and, as a consequence, OSS market shares enlarges.
This clearly accentuates market failure 1.
7 Public policies with network externalities
A relevant feature of software markets is the presence of network externalities:
the individual beneﬁt from adopting a certain software is positively aﬀected by
the number of other individuals having adopted the same software or a compat-
ible one. This eﬀect lies on the simple observation that the more widespread a
package, the easier is to exchange ﬁles and information with other users and,
therefore, the higher the utility from adopting that particular software.18
It is interesting to extend our analysis by introducing network externalities
into the model and to verify how our results change when these eﬀects are taken
into account. The simplest way to model network eﬀects at the individual level
is to introduce an additive term in the utility functions (1) and (2):19
Uc = v + θNc − tx − p, Uo = v + θNo − t(1 − x).
where Ni represents the number of consumers adopting software i = open,
closed and θ ≥ 0 measures the strength of network eﬀects:20 the greater θ,
the larger the individual utility from joining a network with other Ni users.
The analysis goes in the same way as in the previous section: we start by
18Despite the relevance of network externalities has been commonly accepted in software
markets, there are only few econometric papers that try to prove empirically the role of
network eﬀects in the software industry. These works mainly focus on the spreadsheets
segment of the market; see Gandal (1994) and Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996).
19We follow a standard way to model network externalities, see Shy (2001).
20We are also assuming that closed and open source software are incompatible. This
amounts to saying that network externalities are based only on the number of users adopting
the same software. The case of compatible software is less relevant in practice and also of
less theoretical interest.
17characterising the socially optimal allocation and we use this as a reference
point for the following discussion.
The most interesting case is when network eﬀects are not too strong; in
this case it is possible to prove the following proposition:
Proposition 4 (Second best with network eﬀects). With low network
externalities, θ ≤ t−v





2θ (t − 2θη (1 − η) − vη) − t2
2[2θ (t − θη (1 − η)) − t2]
, (13)




(θ (1 − η) + v)(2θ (1 − η) − t)
2θ (t − θη (1 − η)) − t2 . (14)
From Proposition 4 an interesting consequence follows immediately:










This corollary has a clear explanation. In the second best scenario, the
planner takes the mass of uninformed consumers as given; therefore, since
these consumers can only be assigned with CSS, the closed source software
has a larger potential installed base. A software with a wider installed base
induces larger network eﬀects which translate into higher welfare levels: with
network externalities, the government tends to prefer CSS to OSS and this
preference is stronger the larger the externalities. According with Corollary 1,
the stronger the network externalities, the larger the socially eﬃcient closed
source software market share.
Corollary 1 provides also the intuition for what happens when θ is large.
When network eﬀects are very strong, the second best requires standardisation
towards CSS.21
Unfortunately, even in this extremely simpliﬁed framework, we are not able
to formally characterise the impact of the various policies on social welfare.
For this reason, we proceed as follows; in the ﬁrst part, we restrict the analysis
21Note that the ﬁrst best is achieved when η = 0 and, for θ large, with full standardisation
towards either CSS or OSS. Indeed, in the ﬁrst best scenario the potential installed base
of the two softwares is the same: 1. However, this is a trivial result, which is also of little
empirical evidence given that network eﬀects do not have such a pervasive role.
18to a neighborhood of θ = 0; this allows us to evaluate analytically how the
eﬀectiveness of the policies changes with small network eﬀects. In the last part
of the paper we extend the model to the analysis of larger values of θ through
numerical simulations.
7.1 A local analysis
A ﬁrst and insightful discussion about the eﬀectiveness of the proposed govern-
ment policies in the presence of network externalities can be conducted locally,
by analysing the model in a neighborhood of θ = 0. Formally, we consider the
derivatives with respect to θ of the previous policies and we evaluate their sign









θ→0, where i=β, α and s; when the
sign is positive, the externality reinforces the impact of the policy when this
has a positive impact, and it makes it less damaging when it has a negative
welfare eﬀect.
Since the role of network eﬀects is similar in all the three policies presented
in this paper, we focus only on the case of mandatory adoption.22
Proposition 5. The presence of small network eﬀects, makes the policy more
eﬀective (or, equivalently, makes it less damaging) if there are few uninformed
users; with larger shares of uninformed consumers, this happens only if the









> 0 if i) η < 0.139 and ii) if η > 0.37 provided that
β > ˆ β, with ˆ β ∈ (0,1).
From the analysis of the second best, we know that with network exter-
nalities, welfare increases as long as the market tips towards standardisation
on one software: in this case network eﬀects, and therefore the welfare, are at
their maximum level.
When η is small, the vast majority of consumers is informed and since OSS
is provided for free, it gains a larger users’ installed base than CSS. By man-
dating additional consumers to adopt OSS, the government tilts the market
even further towards open source software; this reinforces the positive welfare
eﬀect of a larger installed base and improves the performance of the policy.
Therefore, as stated in Proposition 5, when η is small the presence of network
eﬀects makes mandatory adoption more eﬀective (or less damaging in case the
policy has an overall negative eﬀect on welfare) in enhancing social welfare.
On the contrary, when the number of uninformed consumers is large enough,
22The analyses of the information campaign and of the subsidisation policy go exactly in
the same way and we make them available on request.
19then OSS can no longer enjoy of a larger installed base. As a consequence,
the presence of network eﬀects improves the eﬀectiveness of the policy only if
the government is able to inﬂuence the adoption decision of a great amount of
consumers thus making OSS the software with the largest installed base.
Similar arguments can be applied when the government acts via an infor-
mation campaign or through subsidisation.
7.2 Some simulations
The main message emerging from the previous section is that the presence of
network eﬀects makes the policies in support of OSS more eﬀective (or less
damaging) when the open source software has the largest installed base or
when it is able to gain it thanks to the policies themselves. However, this
analysis does not allow us to fully appreciate the role of network eﬀects, that
is to discuss whether the various policies increase or decrease welfare in the
presence of network externalities. In this ﬁnal section we provide a more global
analysis on the role of network eﬀects; we do so by resorting to numerical
simulations.
Consider the case of mandatory adoption. Figure 2 plots diﬀerent cut-
oﬀ functions η(β): these functions give for any value of β the corresponding
value of η such that dW/dβ > 0 for η > η(β). The plot given in ﬁgure 2
has been drawn for v = 1 and t = 1.3 and for ﬁve values of the externality:
θ = 0,0.05,0.1,0.15,0.2.23
When θ = 0, η(β) is constant: η(β) = η ≈ 0.8; as we already know from
Proposition 1, the policy increases social welfare if and only if η > η. Figure 2
shows that for larger values of θ, the cut-oﬀ function η(β) becomes negatively
sloped.
This implies that i) when the policy mandates few consumers, i.e. β close
to the origin, then the policy has a positive welfare eﬀect only if there are few
uninformed consumers, fewer than without network eﬀects (η > η(β) > η) and
that ii) when the policy mandates a large number of users to adopt OSS, then
it is good for society also if there are many uninformed users (η < η(β) < η).
Moreover, since η(β) becomes steeper as θ increases, impacts i) and ii)
become more relevant as the externalities gets stronger.
23These are reasonable values of the parameters; we have run a complete scan of the
parameters space and we have obtained plots with the same characteristics.
20Figure 2: the function η(β)
From this analysis we conclude that with signiﬁcant network externalities,
the impact on social welfare of a policy based on mandatory adoption depends
on the amount of consumers that the government is able inﬂuence. Given
that with network externalities welfare tends to be maximised when there is
standardisation towards one software, then mandatory adoption is more likely
to be welfare increasing when the government is able to mandate the adoption
of a large number of consumers, thus tilting the market towards OSS.
Similar conclusions can be derived in case of an information campaign.
From Proposition 2 we know that without network externalities this policy al-
ways improves social welfare. This remains true also for small values of θ. How-
ever, with stronger network eﬀects things may change radically. In Figure 3 we
plot diﬀerent welfare functions W(α) for ﬁve values of θ = 0,0.2,0.4,0.6,0.8
and 1.24
24Again, we have plotted these functions for v = 1 and t = 1.3; furthermore, we have
assumed η = 0.5. Similar results are obtained with diﬀerent values.
21Figure 3: the function W(α)
As expected, W(α) shifts upwards as θ enlarges: for given α, welfare is
higher the stronger the externality. As shown in the ﬁgure, for low values of
θ, W(α) is always positively sloped. However, when θ is large (i.e. θ = 1),
W(α) becomes U-shaped: for low values of α the information campaign re-
duces welfare. Again, the intuition for this result relies on the presence of
network externalities. When θ is large, welfare tends to be maximised when
there is one software that prevails on the other. However the presence of a suf-
ﬁciently large mass of uninformed consumers makes CSS the software with the
largest installed base; this implies that market forces themselves move towards
standardisation on CSS and this is eﬃcient in terms of welfare. Therefore, in
this case, informing few consumers (α low) about the existence of OSS can
only induce a deterioration in the level of welfare. Some of these consumers
are induced to shift to OSS but they do not internalise the negative eﬀect that
this decision produces on those consumers who continue to adopt CSS.
On the contrary, as in the case of mandatory adoption, the information
campaign has a positive eﬀect on welfare when the government informs many
consumers (α large) since in this case the regulator helps the market to stan-
dardise on OSS.
22Figure 4: the function W(s)
Finally, consider the case of a public subsidy payed to OSS adopters. Figure
4 shows total welfare as a function of the subsidy when θ = 0,0.2,0.4,0.6,0.8
and 1.25
Again, as θ gets larger, W(s) shifts upwards. In this case W(s) is always
negatively sloped irrespective on the strength of network eﬀects: subsidising
OSS always harms society.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have analysed the impact on social welfare of the three most
popular government policies in support of the open source software that have
been proposed in many countries. The analysis has been conducted using a
25Again, we have plotted these functions for v = 1 and t = 1.3 and η = 0.5 but similar
plots can be obtained with diﬀerent parameters’ values.
23static model in which an open source and a closed source/commercial software
compete. According to the observation of what happens in the reality, we
divide consumers according to their knowledge of the open source: the more
experienced consumers usually know the existence and the characteristics of
the software open source while the others, less experienced users, may ignore
it; in the ﬁrst case they are said ”informed”, while they are ”uninformed”
otherwise. Competition occurs only in the segment of informed consumers.
We have shown that while the promotion of OSS through public subsidies
paid to OSS adopters always induces a decline in the level of social welfare,
implementing a less intrusive policy such as information campaign may actually
increase welfare. Finally, the policy aimed at mandating OSS adoption in
public agencies, schools and universities improves welfare only if the market is
characterised by a large mass of uniformed consumers.
In the last part of the paper, we have extended the model in order to con-
sider the case of network externalities, a situation which is extremely relevant
in the software market. As expected, with signiﬁcant network eﬀects manda-
tory adoption and information campaign increases welfare only when they are
”drastic”: when the government is able to inﬂuence a large mass of consumers
then the market tilts towards the open source software and network eﬀects are
at the maximum level thus pushing welfare up. On the contrary, subsidisation
always lower social welfare no matter the magnitude of network externalities.
24References
Bessen, J. (2002). What Good is Free Software? in Hahn (2002).
Brynjolfsson, E. and Kemerer, C. (1995). Network Externalities in Micro-
computer Software: An Econometric Analysis of the Spreadsheet Market.
MIT Center for Information Systems Research, working paper no. 265.
Casadesus-Masanell, R. and Ghemawat, P. (2003). Linux vs. Windows: Mod-
eling Competition between Open-Source and Closed Software. Harvard
Business School, mimeo.
Evans, D. S. (2002). Politics and Programming: Government Preferences for
Promoting Open Source Software. in Hahn (2002).
Evans, D. S. and Reddy, B. (2002). Government Preferences for Promoting
Open-Source Software: a Solution in Search of a Problem. N.E.R.A.
working paper.
Gandal, N. (1994). Hedonic Price Indexes for Spreadsheets and an Empirical
Test of the Network Externalities Hypothesis. RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics, 25:160–170.
Hahn, R. W. (2002). Government Policy toward Open Source Software. AEI-
Brooking Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Washington D.C.
Lakhani, K. R. and von Hippel, E. How Open Source Software Works: ”Free”
User-to-Assistance.
Lerner, J. and Tirole, J. (2002). Some Simple Economics of Open Source.
Journal of Industrial Economics, 50:197–234.
Raymond, E. (1999). The Cathedral and the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and
Open Source from an Accidental Revolutionary. Sebastapol: CA: O’Reilly
and Associates.
Schmidt, K. and Schnitzer, M. (2003). Public Subsidies for Open Source?
Some Economic Policy Issues of the Software Market. CEPR Discussion
Paper, No. 3793.
Shy, O. (2001). The Economics of Network Industries. Cambridge University
Press.
Smith, B. L. (2002). The Future of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to
Decide. in Hahn (2002).
25Appendix
Pure market equilibrium: restrictions on the parameters. In order to ensure




i ≤ 1, 0 ≤ x
∗
u ≤ 1, U
∗






u are given in expressions (7), (8) and (9).
The ﬁrst two conditions guarantee that at the market equilibrium the indif-
ferent consumers lie on the [0,1] segment; the third condition ensures that the
indiﬀerent informed consumer gets non negative utility.

















Putting all these conditions together it is easy to verify that the model exists
for:
v ∈ (v,v), where v =
t(3 + η)
2(2 + η)




Proof of Proposition 1. When the government extracts β consumers form the
entire population and forces them to adopt OSS, ﬁrm’s equilibrium proﬁts are
simply (1 − β) times the proﬁts given in (5):










and ﬁrm’s optimal price is the same as in the pure market equilibrium. More-
over, the range of existence of the model is the same as in the pure market
equilibrium case.
Two cases must be considered: i) the gross utility v is not big enough and
among the mandated consumers, only those located ”non too far” from the
26right end of the segment adopt OSS, and ii) v is so high that, irrespective
of their location, all the selected consumers buy the OSS. Formally: i)v < t
such that only those located in (t−v
t ,1) adopt OSS, and ii)v ≥ t. Note that
t ∈ (v,v) so that case i) is deﬁned only for v ∈ (v,t) while case ii) is deﬁned
for v ∈ (t,v).
The net consumer surplus of the informed, the uninformed and the mandated
consumers are respectively:









(v − t(1 − µ)) dµ
#
,










(v − t(1 − µ))dµ.
where in the expression for Sm we have incorporated the two possible cases i)
and ii). Let us prove the proposition for case i); the proof for case ii) goes in
the same way and it is omitted for brevity.26
In this case, total welfare which is deﬁned as the sum of consumers’ and pro-
ducer’s surplus, W = Si + Su + Sm + π, is:
W =
((4(1 − β)η2 + 8(η + β))v2 + t(1 − β)(1 − η)(4(3η + 4)v − t(3η + 5)))
16(1 + η)t
.




−(3t2 − 12vt + 4v2)η2 − 2t(t − 2v)η − 16vt + 8v2 + 5t2
16(1 + η)t
.
The sign of this expression is given by the sign of the numerator which is a
parabola in η, with η ∈ (0,1). It is easy to verify that at the extremes η = 0

















From simple inspection, it is immediate to check that at η = 0, dW/dβ < 0
for any v ∈ (v,t) while at η = 1, dW/dβ > 0. This is suﬃcient to prove that
there exists a unique value ¯ η ∈ (0,1) such that dW/dβ < 0 for η < ¯ η and
dW/dβ > 0 otherwise.
26Proof available on request.
27Proof of Proposition 2. Firm’s proﬁts are:
π = p

(1 − η + α)
t − p
2t





Solving the ﬁrst order condition, ﬁrm’s optimal price is:27
p
∗ =
t(1 − η + α) + 2v (η − α)
2(1 + η − α)
. (15)
Unlike for the case of mandatory adoption, with an information campaign
ﬁrm’s optimal price changes with respect to the pure market case: we need to
ﬁnd the new range of parameters for the existence of the model. It is possible






Replacing (15) into the expressions for the indiﬀerent consumers (3) and (4)
and into the consumers surpluses given in (10) and(11), we ﬁnally derive the
total welfare:
W =
4(α − η)(α − 2 − η)v2 − 4t
 
η − 4 − α − 6ηα + 3η2 + 3α2
v + t2 (1 − η + α)(3α − 3η − 5)
16t(1 + η − α)
.
(16)




(3t2 + 4v2 − 12vt)(α − η)(α − 2 − η) + 8v2 + 7t2 − 20vt
16t(1 + η − α)
2 . (17)





2t(1 + η − α)
3,
which is always negative for α ∈ (0,η): dW/dα is monotonically decreasing in
α. In order to verify that the welfare increases with α it is enough to show
that dW/dα > 0 at α = η. From expression (17):
dW
dα
   
α=η
=
20vt − 8v2 − 7t2
16t
.
The sign of this expression is given by the sign of the numerator which is
concave in v. It is easy to verify that the numerator is positive at v = v and
at v = v, which is suﬃcient to guarantee that it is positive for any admissible
value of v.




t < 0 and it is always satisﬁed.
28Proof of Proposition 3. Consider the market for the informed consumers. When
the government pays a subsidy s to all those individuals who adopt OSS, the
indiﬀerent consumer is located at xi, where xi solves the following condition:
v − p − txi = v + s − t(1 − xi),=⇒ x
∗
i =
t − p − s
2t
. (18)
The location of the indiﬀerent uniformed consumer does not change with re-












Solving the ﬁrst order condition, the optimal price is:28
p
∗ =
(t − s)(1 − η) + 2η v
2 + 2η
.
Replacing this price into the expressions for the indiﬀerent consumers (18) and
(4) and into the consumers surpluses given in (11) and (10), we can derive the





(1 − η)(s + t(1 − η) + 7sη + 2η v)
8t(1 + η)
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. In the second best scenario the planner takes η as given
and chooses the allocation (xi,xu) in order to maximise total welfare; denoting
with GSi and GSu the gross surplus of informed and uninformed consumers
respectively, the second best allocation can be derived by solving the following
maximisation problem:





(v + θ((1 − η)xi + ηxu) − tµ)dµ +
Z 1
xi
(v + θ(1 − η)(1 − xi) − t(1 − µ))dµ

,




t < 0 and it is always satisﬁed. Moreover, the
model exists for v ∈ [v,v], where in this case:
v =
(t − s)(3 + η)
2(2 + η)
, v =






(v + θ((1 − η)xi + η(xu)) − tµ)dµ

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Let us deﬁne θ = t−v
2 ; in what follows we characterise the second best allocation















2θ (−2θη (1 − η) + t − vη) − t2





(θ (1 − η) + v)(2θ (1 − η) − t)
2θ (−θη (1 − η) + t) − t2 .
To complete the proof, we need to verify that 0 ≤ xsb
i ,xsb
u ≤ 1. By simple
algebraic manipulation, one can note that: i) a suﬃcient condition for xsb
i ≥ 0
is that θ < min{ t
2(1−η), t
2η}; since θ < min{ t
2(1−η), t
2η}, then xsb
i ≥ 0; ii) xsb
i ≤ 1
for θ ≤ t2
2(t+vη), with θ < t2
2(t+vη); iii) xsb
u ≥ 0 for θ ≤ t
2(1−η), with θ < t
2(1−η)
and ﬁnally; iv) xsb
u ≤ 1 for
2 (1 − η)θ
2 + (2v (1 − η) − t(3 − η))θ + t(t − v) ≥ 0.
This last expression decreases with η.30 It is possible to verify that for any
θ ≤ θ, the above inequality holds at η = 1, which is enough to prove that
xsb
i ≤ 1. This completes the proof.










−2 (1 − η)(t + η v)θ
2 + 2t
2 (1 − η)θ + vt
2
}.
29Proof available on request.
30More precisely, it decreases with η for θ > t−2v
2 ; given that v > t/2, t−2v
2 < 0 and this
expression is decreasing with η for any θ ≥ 0.
30The above expression is a concave function of θ, it is positive at θ = 0 and
at θ = t2
2(t+vη) > θ. Therefore, xsb
i increases with θ for any θ ≤ θ. Similarly,














(t − v)η2 − (2t − v)η + t

θ + t2 (t(1 − η) + 2η v)}.
This expression does not have real roots in θ and it is always positive for
θ ≤ θ.
Proof of Proposition 5. 31 In order to prove the proposition, we need to deter-
mine the market equilibrium. We focus on the case with v > t so that all the
consumers that are mandated by the government do actually adopt OSS. A
similar reasoning applies for v < t.
With network eﬀects the location of the indiﬀerent informed and uninformed
consumers are obtained by solving the following system of equations:

v + θ(xi(1 − η)(1 − β) + xuη(1 − β)) − txi − p = v + θ((1 − xi)(1 − η)(1 − β) + β) − t(1 − xi),
v + θ(xi(1 − η)(1 − β) + xuη(1 − β)) − txu − p = 0
where the ﬁrst equation deﬁnes the indiﬀerent informed consumer while the
second one the indiﬀerent uninformed consumer. Let the locations of the
indiﬀerent informed/uninformed consumer when the ﬁrm charges the price p,
x∗∗
i (p) and x∗∗
u (p), be solution to this system of equation,32 then the ﬁrm sets
p to maximize its proﬁt:
π = p(1 − β)((1 − η)x
∗∗
i (p) + ηx
∗∗
u (p)).







2 + η β (1 − η)

+ (1 − η)vη (1 − β)

θ − t2 (1 − η) − 2η tv
−2t(1 + η) + 2θη (1 − β)(1 − η)
.
The equilibrium indiﬀerent consumers x∗∗
i and x∗∗
u can be obtained replacing
this expression into x∗∗
i (p) and x∗∗
u (p). Equilibrium proﬁts and the surplus
enjoyed by informed and uniformed consumers are respectively:
π = p∗(1 − β)((1 − η)x∗∗
i + ηx∗∗
u ),
31This is a sketch of the proof. Full details are available on request.
32For the sake of brevity, we omit to present x∗∗
i and x∗∗
u and we make them available on
request.
33Note that in Proposition 5 we restrict our analysis in a neighborhood of θ = 0. In this








t < 0 is veriﬁed.
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#
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(v + θ((1 − η)(1 − β)(1 − x∗∗
i ) + β) − tµ)dµ

.
Total welfare is: W = Si + Su + Sm + π.
We can now prove the proposition. By diﬀerentiating twice the equilibrium
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> 0 if and only if β > B
A ≡ b β.
Next, we need to verify when b β ∈ (0,1); we do so by using the fact that the
model is deﬁned for v ∈ (t,v), where v =
t(3+η)
2 .34













4η (η (2+3η)+3) . It can be veriﬁed that
34Remember that we are analysing the model in a neighborhood of θ = 0: the model
exists for any v ∈ (t,
t(3+η)
2 ,) as in case ii) in the proof of Proposition 1.
32e v < t for η > 0.37, while v > e v for η > 0.139.
Summing up, we have proved that i) b β < 0, and therefore expression (20) is
always positive, for η < 0.139, and ii) b β ∈ (0,1), and therefore (20) is positive
for β > b β, when η > 0.37. Finally, when η ∈ (0.139,0.37), b β < 0 for any
v ∈ (t,e v) and b β ∈ (0,1) for any v ∈ (e v,v). Therefore, in the former case (20)
is always positive, while in the latter it is positive provided that β > b β.
33